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Duverger (1954) noted that changes in electoral systems will have two types of effects: 
mechanical effects, and reactions of political agents in anticipation of these, which he referred 
to as psychological effects. It is complicated to empirically separate the two effects since 
these occur simultaneously. In this paper we use a large set of counterfactual election 
outcomes to address this issue. Our application is based on a nationwide municipal electoral 
reform in Norway, which changed the seat allocation method from d’Hondt to modified 
Sainte-Lagüe. Even though this electoral reform is of a relatively small magnitude, we 
document substantial psychological effects. 
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Electoral reforms stimulate strategic behavior from all agents who care about the elec-
tion's outcome (Cox (1997)). Strategic behavior can occur both on the demand and the
supply side of the political system: citizens are eager not to waste their votes; political
elites are eager not to waste their eort and resources. In the terminology of Duverger
(1954), political agents' responses in anticipation of the electoral law's mechanical con-
straints, constitute the psychological eects of the electoral reform. Mechanical eects
capture how vote counts translate into seats. To empirically separate mechanical from
psychological eects is complicated since these occur simultaneously. In this paper we
combine an exogenous political reform with a novel method to empirically disentangle
the two types of eects.
While most existing analyses of electoral reforms are based on national data, often
comparing majoritarian to proportional elections system, we study a Norwegian municipal
electoral reform within the class of proportional election systems.1 Two specic features
of this reform allow us to treat it as exogenous to local politics. First, and most im-
portant, the municipal-level reform was uniformly imposed by the national government.
This feature eliminates the potential endogeneity issue that the reform is a product of
bargaining among existing parties. This concern is an important limitation of studies at
the national levels (as discussed by Shugart (1992) and Benoit (2004)). Second, while the
reform we study changed the allocation formula in use at the municipal level, it did not
aect the allocation formula used in the county elections held simultaneously. Having
voting data for a separate oce, for the same electorate, where the electoral formula
remained constant is useful because it allows us to isolate the electoral reform's eect of
electoral reform from any other general time trends.
Studying a reform at the municipal rather than national level provides additional
1There are some examples of studies looking at dierences within countries such as Cox (1997) and
Benoit (2001). Also, there is a growing literature using regression discontinuity designs to exploit pop-
ulation thresholds for dierences in local political systems (e.g. Fujiwara (2008), Pettersson-Lidbom
(2008), Eggers (2010)).
2benets. The most important is that we can evaluate how a large set of homogenous
political entities respond to the same electoral reform. The large sample oers a unique
opportunity to trace patterns in the seat allocations that studies conducted at the national
level cannot oer.
Our empirical approach of separating mechanical from psychological eects builds on
the method proposed by Blais et al. (2011). The basic idea is to utilize the electoral
system's formulaic structure to generate a large set of counterfactual election outcomes.
While Blais et al. (2011) compare election outcomes between two simultaneous elections
with dierent electoral rules, we utilize an electoral reform regarding the seat allocation
method. The empirical strategy, utilizing variation in electoral systems over time, allow
us to overcome some of the potential limitations in Blais et al. (2011).
The particular reform we examine is a switch from a d'Hondt (DH) to a modied
Sainte-Lagu e (MSL) seat allocation formula, eective from the 2003 municipal elections.
A change the from the DH to MSL method mechanically increases the proportionality
of the seat allocation - mostly because of a reduction in the eective electoral threshold.
The main expected psychological eects can be derived from agents' anticipating the
consequences of the lower electoral threshold. For citizens, the incentives to vote for
small parties increases after the reform since in the MSL system small parties are more
likely to reach the electoral threshold. For small parties, the mechanics of the electoral
system incentivizes strategic entry. This eect will be magnied the stronger the belief
about the fraction of strategic voters in the population.2
Lijphart (1994) suggests that an important eect of electoral reform is that the parties
that would have beneted from the status quo will act to reduce the reform's eects. In
our setting, pre-reform incumbents may use their discretion to set the size of the council
for this strategic purpose. Reducing the council's size will increase the eective electoral
threshold, thus oseting the eect of the electoral reform.
Our results conrm our prior expectations and show that both political parties and
2Strategic voters are those who make voting decisions conditional on the expectations that their votes
will be pivotal in the elections's outcome(Kawai and Watanabe (2010)).
3voters responded to the change in seat allocation method. More parties ran in the munici-
pal elections, and also made it into the municipal council. Citizens voted for small parties
to a larger extent, shifting the vote distribution towards small parties. We also document
that pre-reform incumbents tended to decrease the council size, which reduced the eect
of the reform. We argue that our identication strategy allows us to give our results a
causal interpretation. This is supported by our results being insensitive to controlling for
general changes in party support common to municipal and county elections.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the electoral
reform and the expected consequences of the reform. We provide the institutional back-
ground and descriptive statistics in Section 3. In Section 4 we present our empirical
strategy and relate our approach to the one pursued by Blais et al. (2011). The results
are presented in Section 5, while Section 6 concludes.
2 Electoral Reform
In October 1997 Norway's national government appointed an electoral reform commission
with the mandate to simplify and revise the electoral system. In January 2001 this
commission presented a report with proposed electoral reforms. One of the proposed
reforms was to change the allocation formula used at the municipal level for translating
votes into seats from a d'Hondt (DH) to a modied Sainte-Lagu e (MSL) formula.3 In
this paper we study the consequences of this electoral reform, which in June 2002 were
incorporated in the electoral law.4 Before we consider the predictions of the electoral
reform, we explain the mechanics of these two seat allocation methods.
3The seat allocation formula in use at the municipal level in Norway before the electoral reform
consisted of two steps, which where a mix between a largest remainder method and a highest average
method. It can be shown that the rst step is superuous and that the seat allocation method is
equivalent to a DH method (Hylland (2010)).
4The electoral reform commission other proposals were mostly relevant at the national level of gov-
ernment.
42.1 Seat Allocation Methods
D'Hondt (DH) and modied Sainte-Lagu e (MSL) are seat allocation methods within the
class of highest average methods, the basic principle of this method class is to distribute
seats in consecutive rounds to the party that \most deserves" a seat. This is achieved by
using a series of divisors, which depend on the seats previously awarded to the party. The
division series is used to calculate \comparison numbers" and the party with the highest
comparison number is awarded the seat. This procedure is repeated until all seats have
been allocated.
Highest average methods are dierentiated by what divisor series is used. The DH
method uses the divisor series (s) \1, 2, 3, 4,...", the regular (unmodied) SL method
uses the divisor series \1, 3, 5, 7,...", and the MSL method uses the divisor series \1.4,
3, 5, 7,...". The formula for calculating the comparison number is then v/(1+s), where v
denotes the total number of votes.
The main dierence between these three methods is how proportional the seat allo-
cation is in relation to the vote shares. On average, SL gives a seat allocation that is
directly proportional to the vote share, while DH gives an advantage to large parties.
MSL yields a seat allocation that falls somewhere in between the other two methods
in terms of proportionality. In the Appendix we explain this in more detail. We also
illustrate how dierent seat allocation methods work using simulated data.
There is no explicit eective threshold for when a party will receive its rst seat in any
of the seat allocation methods. This is because the seats for a party depend not only the
share of votes it receives, but also on the vote shares of all the other parties. However, the
eective threshold for the respective methods are approximately 100=(seats+1) for DH,
100=(seats  1:4) for MSL, and 100=(seats  2) for SL. For example, changing from DH
to MSL will reduce the eective electoral threshold from approximately 3:57 percent to
2:65 percent for a 27-member council size (the average size in Norwegian municipalities).
52.2 Predicted Eects of the Electoral Reform
The mechanical eects of the electoral reform follow from the discussion in the previous
section. In the absence of any adjustments from citizens or elites (psychological eects),
changing from the DH to MSL method is expected to give more proportional election
outcomes. Due to the lower eective electoral threshold, we also expect the (eective)
number of parties gaining representation to increase.
The lower eective threshold may also give rise to three types of psychological eects,
described below.
Strategic voters: The rational choice theory of voting stresses that individuals are
motivated to vote because they can aect the election's outcome (Downs (1957)). If
voters are instrumentally motivated, the electoral reform is likely to aect voter behavior.
Votes for small parties that were previously viewed as wasted are now more likely to been
seen as going to a party that has a chance for winning representation. After the reform,
instrumentally motivated voters are therefore more likely to cast their vote for minor
parties.5 In the terminology of Cox (1997) this implies that strategic desertions from
minor parties are expected to be lower after the reform. Cox provides empirical evidence
of strategic desertion in Chile, Columbia and Japan. Based on these arguments we expect
a larger share of votes will be cast for small parties.
Strategic parties: Duverger's prediction that plurality systems will essentially converge
to a to two-party system rests on the idea that the entries and exits of political parties
are sensitive to anticipated defeat (Duverger (1954)). It is expected that the same type of
mechanisms also will be found in proportional election systems (Cox (1997)). Cox refers
to this type of behavior as strategic entry. Here the key factors are the district magnitude
and electoral formula, which together decide the representation and the disproportionality
5The extent to which voters are instrumentally motivated is debated. Clearly, the simplest formulation
of the rational choice theory of voting cannot explain observed turnout levels in large-scale elections. The
instrumental motive may, however, still be important on the margin and in the small-scale elections that
we study (Blais (2000)). Kawai and Watanabe (2010) draw an important distinction between misaligned
voting (voting for a candidate other than the most preferred) and strategic voting (votes cast conditional
on the event that their votes are pivotal) and nd a large fraction of strategic voters in Japanese general-
election data.
6of the seat allocation. Since entry is costly, both in terms of eort and resources, parties
will enter the election only if the benets from running outweigh the costs.6 For small
parties, the expected benets from participating in the election increases after the reform
is implemented. We therefore expect more parties to run in a given district after the
reform. We also expect parties to be less likely to form joint lists.
Strategic incumbents: In our empirical setting, a municipality's discretion to set the
size of it's council may be used to oset the eect of the reform. Reducing the council
size will increase the eective electoral threshold and increase the advantage for large
parties. Thus we would expect to see a reduction in the council sizes at the time of
the reform. Such \defensive behavior" is expected to dampen the reform's eect on the
(eective) number of parties obtaining representation. We could naturally expect other
types of strategic behavior from the incumbents, such as trying to capture policy issues
from small parties and increased campaigning. These types of behaviors, however, are
dicult to quantify which is why we omit leave them from the analysis.
While the mechanical eect of changing the electoral system would be to increase
proportionality, the psychological eects go in the opposite direction. Shifting the vote
distribution towards smaller parties, either as a consequence of strategic behavior from
voters or parties, would reduce the disproportionality of the system. \Defensive behavior"
from incumbents would also dampen the eect of the reform, thus contributing to reducing
the disproportionality of the system.
After the reform the mechanical eect on the (eective) number of parties gaining
representation is expected to be positive. More parties running (strategic parties) and an
increased fraction of votes for small parties (strategic voters) would, naturally, also lead
to more parties, while a reduction in council size (strategic incumbents) would lead to a
reduction of parties running.
6Cox (1997) argues that parties that would suer from a disproportionate seat allocation will be less
likely to participate. He shows, using data from Japan, that an increased proportionality of the seat
allocation leads to more parties participating in the elections.
73 Institutional Setting and Data
3.1 Institutional Setting
Norwegian municipalities are multipurpose authorities responsible for conducting impor-
tant services provided by the welfare state. Each municipality is run by a local council
that makes decisions based on simple majority. The local councils are elected every fourth
year in September in an open list proportional representation election system. Norway
has three tiers of government in Norway: municipal, county, and national governments.
Municipal elections coincide with elections for the county (regional) level of government,
a feature that we exploit in our empirical strategy.7 There are 19 counties in total.
Most of the available party lists that participate in municipal elections also are repre-
sented in the national political arena. These eight parties are the Red Electoral Alliance,
Socialist Left Party, Labor Party, Centre Party, Christian Democratic Party, Liberal
Party, Conservative Party and Progress Party. With the exception of the Red Electoral
Alliance and the Liberal Party, these six parties have been represented in the national
assembly continuously since 1981. There are also smaller political parties that obtain
little nationwide support and party independent local lists.8 Finally, parties may form
joint lists where the seats are allocated to the parties jointly.
In addition to voting for a party list, voters can also aect the election outcome
by expressing candidate preferences (for candidates from any party list). In the 2007
municipal election about 40 percent of voters took the opportunity to do so. This has
substantial implications for the allocation of seats in the local councils.9
The number of council member is chosen by the previous local council (within the
rst three years of the election period), but the local discretion is subject to restrictions
7National elections also have a xed four-year election cycle, but these elections lag the municipal
and county elections with two years.
8None of these parties have been able to obtain parliamentary representation except for the Com-
munist Party of Norway (which historically received substantial support) and the Coastal Party (who
received one mandate in the 1997 election).
9About 67 percent of seats in the local councils were decided by preferential votes. 25 percent of all
candidates that were elected, got elected exclusively due to preferential votes (Bergh et al. (2010)).
8imposed by the electoral law. The minimum size of the local council depends on the size
of the population.10 This constraint is only binding in a limited number of cases.11
3.2 Descriptive Statistics
As discussed in section 2.2 we expect the electoral reform to have consequences for the
proportionality of the system, the number of party lists in the running, the number of
party lists obtaining representation, the extent of joint lists, and the size of the local
council. These are the outcome variables of our study.
As a measure of disproportionality, we use the index of disproportionality proposed
by Gallagher (1991). The Gallagher index is based on the vote-seat share deviation of
all available parties. By weighting the deviations by their own values, large deviations
count more in the index. More formally, the index is dened as
Index =
v u u t1=2
N X
i=1
(V oteSharei   SeatSharei)
2:
For ease of interpretation, we multiply the index by 100. The index can then take values
from 0 (complete proportionality) to 100 (complete disproportionality).
We will also consider the index of the eective number of parties (ENOP) developed






where SeatSharei is the proportion of seats of the i-th party. ENOP takes into account
both the number of parties represented and their relative strengths. It is widely used for
describing party systems at the national level (Lijphart (1999)).
10The number of council members must be an uneven number. With less than 5,000 inhabitants the
number of council members must be at least 11. Above 5,000 but below 10,000 inhabitants, it must be
at least 19. Above 10,000 but below 50,000 inhabitants, it must be at least 27. Above 50,000 but below
100,000 inhabitants it must be at least 35. Above 100,000 inhabitants it must be at least 43.
11For the 2007-2011 election period, only ve municipalities have the minimum allowed number of
council members.
9Table 1 oer descriptive statistics on the outcome variables we use in the empirical
analysis. The analysis is based on data from 387 municipalities for the election preceding
the reform (1999) and the election following the reform (2003).12
There is substantial variation across municipalities in the number of party lists avail-
able. As shown in Table 1 the average number of party lists available is 6.54, and varies
from 2 to 15. On average, 6.10 party lists obtain political representation in the local
council. The average value of the eective number of parties is 4.24, considerably lower
than the average number of parties that are represented in the local council, which reects
that parties are generally not equal in strength. This is similar to the eective number
of parties found at the national level in Norway.
In our sample the average value of the Gallagher index is 2.66. This is similar to the
historically observed level of disproportionality in legislative elections in countries such as
Germany and Switzerland. It is somewhat smaller than what is observed at the national
level in Norway (Lijphart (1999)).
Finally, we note that the average local council consists of about 27 council members.
Variation in size of the local council is closely related to municipality's population (with
a correlation coecient of 0.80).
In Table 2 we oer separate descriptive statistics for each election period. These tables
illustrate how key variables change from the election held prior to the electoral reform
(1999) to the rst election held following the reform (2003). We nd that the number of
parties available is, on average higher after the electoral reform. The average jumps from
about 6.35 to 6.73. There also is a positive response in the number of lists represented in
the local council, also reected in the measure of the eective number of parties (ENOP).
The disproportionality index is lower after the reform. All these changes are in line with
12In 2003 the total number of municipalities is 434. We drop 41 municipalities where, for any election,
the distribution of votes is inconsistent with the distribution of seats in the data that we have available. In
most of these cases the inconsistency is minor, and our results are basically unaltered if we include these
observations in our empirical analysis. In addition we exclude municipalities that have parliamentary
systems (two municipalities), have a majoritarian electoral system (one municipality), municipalities that
were involved in mergers during this time period (two municipalities) and that have missing data (one
municipality).
10the empirical predictions of the mechanical eect that occurs when changing from DH to
MSL, and will be explored in more detail below. Finally, we note that the average size
of local councils are substantially lower after the electoral reform. The average decrease
is almost three representatives, corresponding to a decrease of about 10 percent in the
average local council.
3.3 Distribution of Votes
In Table 3 we oer descriptive statistics by party lists. The Labor Party is the largest
party, and is represented in almost all municipalities. During the period that we study
the average (unweighted) voteshare is 30 percent. The other parties represented at the
national political arena also are present in most, but not all municipalities. The smallest
of these parties is the Red Electoral Alliance, which was present in only about 22 percent
of the municipalities and represented on local councils in about 9 percent of the munic-
ipalities. Independent local lists are common, and in 37 percent of the municipalities
at least one independent local list is available. Party lists that are rarely seen at the
national political arena are present in about 21 percent of municipal elections. Joint lists
are available in about 7 percent of the municipal elections.
The nal column of Table 3 reports vote shares for each party (or group of parties)
based on voting data from the county election. A comparison with vote shares for the
municipal election (column 4) clearly illustrates that the party structure and voter support
are similar across the two government tiers.
Figure 1 gives the vote distribution before and after the electoral reform. The vote
distribution before the reform is shown by the wider and darker bars, while the vote
distribution after the reform is shown by the lighter narrower bars. We can see that there
is a shift towards the left in the vote distribution. That is, there is a larger share of votes
for small parties after the reform. For example, the share of votes for parties that receive
less than 5 percent of the total votes increases by one third.
113.4 Seat Share - Vote Share Curvature
In Figure 2 we document how the seat share-vote share curvature, meaning the dierence
between the seat share and vote share, depends on a party's vote share before and after
the reform. The data from before the reform, when DH was used, are shown by the
solid circles, while data from after the reform, when MSL was used, are shown by the
X's. Rather than showing data for each party in each municipality (which would give
about 2,500 observations for each election), Figure 2 is constructed by grouping (binning)
parties together based on their vote share, using a bandwidth of 1 percentage point.
As expected, the advantage given to larger parties is larger when using DH than
when using MSL. A party that received 40 percent of the votes before the reform would
on average receive a \seat share bonus" of about 1 percentage points, while it received
a bonus of about half a percentage point after the reform. The dierence between the
two seat allocation methods is smaller than in the simulated data (see the appendix),
possibly reecting strategic voting. If voters abandon small parties with a little chance
of getting on the local council, the advantage for large parties will be smaller than in the
simulated data (which ignores strategic voting).
4 Empirical Strategy
When studying the eects of an electoral reform the main concern is that reforms are
endogenous to political outcomes and commonly a product of bargaining between parties
(Cox (1997); Benoit (2001)). Any observed dierences in the outcomes of interest could
thus be a product of changes in the political structure. In our case this is not a concern
because the electoral reform is not a product of bargaining within the municipalities.
The decision to implement the reform was taken at the national level. Thus, the reform
will be exogenous with respect to political outcomes at the municipal level. We rely on
a regression of the type:
12Yi;t = i + Reformt + Y
County
i;t + "i;t; (1)
where Yi;t is an outcome variable based on the election in municipality i held at time t
(ListsCouncil, ENOP, Index). i is a set of municipal xed eects. Reformt is a dummy
equal to one after the electoral reform, and zero otherwise.  is the parameter of interest
capturing the eect of the electoral reform on Yi;t.
As mentioned above we are also concerned that our estimate of  could be contam-
inated by general changes in party support at the time of the reform. To address this
potential bias we exploit the fact that municipal and county governments elections are
held simultaneously. More explicitly we utilize the information we have on voting behav-
ior by the same electorate for a separate oce, but where the electoral formula remained
constant both before and after the municipal electoral reform. Even though the seat
distribution at the county level is determined by considering the entire county jointly, we
exploit the voting data we have for this oce measured at the municipal level.13 Based
on this reasoning we include the variable Y
County
i;t . This variable is the outcome variable
in municipality i in election held at time t (ListsCouncil, ENOP, Index) if the votes for
the county election were used to generate a local council based on the DH method and
the local council size in use pre-reform. As indicated in Table 3, voting behavior for the
two oces are closely related.14
 captures the causal eect of the electoral reform on Yi;t as long as Cov (Reformt;"i;t) =
0. The identifying assumption is that after conditioning on Y
County
i;t there are no time
varying factors (correlated with reform) that have an independent impact on Yi;t. Since
Y
County
i;t is potentially endogenous to Yi;t we report results both with and without county
controls.
13Andersen et al. (2010) study voter motivation using Norwegian data and a similar identication
strategy.
14Voter turnout tends to be slightly higher for the municipal election (about 65 percent) relative to
the county election (about 60 percent)(Andersen et al. (2010)).
134.1 Mechanical and Psychological Eects
To illustrate our empirical strategy of separating the psychological and mechanical eects,
we use Figure 3 to show the actual outcomes (A and D) and the two main counterfactual
seat allocations (B and C). Our estimates of the reform's total eect, is basically a
comparison of A, applying DH to the 1999 election outcome, to D, applying MSL to the
2003 election outcome. Assume that instead we want to isolate the mechanical eects of
electoral reform. We can do this either by comparing A to B (applying counterfactually
MSL to the 1999 election outcome or by comparing C (applying counterfactually DH to
the 2003 election outcome) to D. In a similar manner we can examine the psychological
eects by comparing either A to C or B to D. In the following paragraphs we explain this
approach in more detail.
Mechanical Eect To estimate the mechanical eect, we use the voting data from a
specic election and create a counterfactual seat allocation using an alternative method
for allocating the seats. We then compare the counterfactual seat allocation to the actual
seat allocation used in the election of interest. In essence this means that we keep
everything, except for the seat allocation method, constant. This analysis allows us to
estimate the mechanical eect of switching from DH to MSL, conditional on the election
outcome.
We rst use the pre-reform election outcome and apply MSL to create the counterfac-
tual seat allocation. We compare the counterfactual MSL seat (B in Figure 3) allocation
to the actual DH seat allocation (A in Figure 3). Thus, we will estimate the mechani-
cal eect of switching from DH to MSL, conditional on the pre-reform voting outcome.
The results from this exercise yields the total eect of electoral reform in the absence
of any strategic responses by voters, parties or incumbents. For this analysis, the inclu-
sion of any county control is irrelevant since we evaluate the reform's eect for a given
vote distribution. We then repeat this exercise using the post-reform voting data. That
is, we estimate the mechanical eect of switching from DH to MSL, conditional on the
14post-reform voting outcome (from C to D in Figure 3).
Psychological Eect We use the same approach to estimate the psychological eect
as we used for estimating the mechanical eect. We rst estimate the psychological eect
conditional on the seat allocation method and having the same council size as prior to
the reform. In other words, we measure the eect of changes in voter and party behavior,
conditional on the pre-reform seat allocation mechanics (from A to C in Figure 3). The
results from this exercise should be interpreted as what the eect of the reform would
have been if the mechanical factors had not changed. We then repeat the exercise for
the post-reform seat allocation (MSL) method (from B to D in Figure 3) using the same
council size as after the reform. This will give us the contribution that the changes in
the vote distribution, either driven by strategic voters or strategic parties, made to the
reform's total eect.
Finally, we repeat the exercise, but use the actual council size to estimate the com-
bined eect of the changes in strategic voting, strategic behavior by parties and strategic
behavior by incumbents, conditional on the seat allocation method used. We do this for
both seat allocation methods (i.e. both A to C and B to D in Figure 3).
4.2 Previous Research
As mentioned above, our empirical strategy is closely related to the one proposed by Blais
et al. (2011).15
The empirical analysis of Blais et al. (2011) is based on both lower and upper house
elections in Switzerland and two simulatenous elections for the Japanese Lower House.
For example, they estimate the psychological eect by determining how dierent the vote
obtained by various parties would have been, given the same set of choices but in the
absence of dierences in electoral rules. For this strategy to produce unbiased estimates
15Previous attempts to separate mechanical from psychological eects are Blais and Carty (1991),
Clark and Golder (2006), which both rely on cross country variation in electoral systems. Van der
Straeten et al. (2010) provides experimental evidence.
15one needs to assume that all factors aecting voter and party behavior, except electoral
rules, are similar across both elections. While this is a substantial improvement relative
to the existing literature, it is not obvious that the identifying assumption is satised.
Our empirical approach, utilizing an arguably exogenous change in the electoral system,
rests on a weaker identifying assumption. In contrast to Blais et al. (2011), it is not
problematic for our empirical strategy if there are omitted factors impacting the political
system as long as these factors remain constant over time.
A related problem is that simultaneous elections can be expected to have an inde-
pendent eect on both voting and party behavior. The existence of electoral balancing
is a well-documented phenomena, both in majoritarian (see for example Bafumi et al.
(2010)) and in proportional election systems (see for example Kern and Hainmueller
(2006)). Thus, voter behavior in one election will be conditional on the expected out-
come in the other election. Simultaneous elections can also aect party behavior. For
example, consider the case of the Swiss simultaneous elections to the upper and lower
house used by Blais et al. (2011). Here, the lower house elections are proportional, while
the upper house elections are conducted in single- or two-member districts. Small parties
therefore have incentives to put their best candidates in the lower house elections, since
they have little chance of winning representation in the upper house election, which also
would give biased results.
Electoral balancing across Norwegian municipal and county elections is unlikely to
be a concern since the elections are held for dierent levels of government with dierent
responsibilities. However, to check whether our results may be sensitive to electoral
balancing we present results both with and without the county controls.
165 Results
5.1 Total Eect
In Table 4 we present results capturing the total eect of the electoral reform (from A
to D in Figure 3) on lists represented in the council, the eective number of parties and
the disproportionality index. In line with the descriptive analysis presented above, we
nd that the reform increased the number of party lists in the council by 0:20. This is a
non-trivial eect which is statistically signicant at the 1 percent level. If no municipality
increases the number of party lists by more than one, the point estimate indicates that an
additional party list will be present in one out of ve municipalities. The county control
is also statistically signicant with the expected positive sign, but it leaves the estimate
of the reform eect basically unaltered.
The eective number of parties increases by 0:26 as a consequence of the electoral
reform, which corresponds to about one-fourth of a standard deviation. This eect is
statistically signicant at the 1 percent level, and also basically unaltered if we include
the county control, which suggests that electoral balancing across the two elections does
not seem to be a source of bias. The positive eect of the county control implies that
when the vote distribution for the county government become more fragmented, i.e. a
higher level of ENOPCountyDH, the eective number of parties at the local council also
increase.
The disproportionality index is reduced by 0:4 percentage-points, which corresponds
to almost one-half a standard deviation decrease in disproportionality. The county control
for this variable is statistically insignicant.
To put these results in context, Lijphart (1994) found that the national reform of
moving to DH to MSL in Norway in the 1950s lead to an increase in the eective number
of parties of 0:35, while enacting the same reform in Sweden lead to an increase of 0:05.
The results we nd are thus comparable to the national reforms. The same reforms lead
to a decrease disproportionality of 4:15 percentage-points in Norway and 1:15 percentage-
17points in Sweden.
5.2 Mechanical Eect
Our estimates of the mechanical eect of the electoral reform is reported in Table 5. In
columns 1, 3, and 5 we present results based on voting data from before the electoral
reform (from A to B in Figure 3). In columns 2, 4, and 6 we present results based on
voting data from after the electoral reform (from C to D in Figure 3).
When taking a given election result and applying the counterfactual seat allocation
method, we nd a mechanical eect on the number of parties represented in the council of
0:12 for 1999 and 0:21 for voting data from 2003. The dierence between the two estimates
of the mechanical eect is caused by dierences in the distribution of votes from 1999 to
2003. That the eect is stronger when we use the 2003 voting data indicates a shift in
voting towards smaller parties, a psychological eect. This highlights the fact that the
mechanical eect is dependent on voting outcomes.
For the eective number of parties (ENOP), as shown in columns 3 and 4, we nd
that the mechanical eect has the same basic magnitude as the total eect when we use
data prior to the reform, but is somewhat larger if we use the post-reform data.
Even if there are substantial psychological eects, it is not unreasonable that the me-
chanical eect is similar to the total eect, the reason is that the eective parties measure
takes the whole distribution of parties into account, and will be relatively insensitive to
the voter support for minor parties, as well as the minor parties' decision to run in the
election.
For the Gallagher Index of disproportionality the mechanical eect is double the size
of the total eect, which indicates that psychological eects dampen the total eects of
the electoral system change.
185.3 Psychological Eects
Following the discussion in section 2.2, the psychological eects that seem to be present
may be driven by the strategic behavior of voters, parties, or incumbents. There could be
a \supply eect" where more party lists are available for voters and smaller parties exert
more electoral eort. Also there could be a \demand eect" where voters are more likely
to cast their votes for smaller parties. Naturally there could also be a combination of the
two. In addition, if pre-reform incumbents strategically change the total number of seats
on the local council to be allocated in the next election, this may work as a countervailing
eect, moderating both supply and demand eects.
We start the analysis by examining three outcome variables that can be expected to
be aected by the reform: the total lists available for voters, the number joint party lists,
and the council size based on actual election outcomes (from A to D in Figure 3).
The results for these three outcomes are presented in Table 6. We document a con-
siderable \supply eect" of available party lists. The point estimate when ListsAvailable
serves as the dependent variable is 0:38 and statistically signicant at the 1 percent level.
We nd that this estimate is slightly lower, 0:30 if we control for the corresponding
variable at the county election.
Our results for the number of joint lists show that the results for the number of
available lists is not driven by parties from the same political block that stop forming
joint party lists after the reform. The point estimate does suggest that there are fewer
joint lists as a consequence of the reform, but the eect is small and not statistically
signicant at conventional levels. Including a dummy for the availability of joint lists at
the county level does not change this conclusion. This variable is negatively associated
with the number of joint lists at the local level, which is contrary to what one would
expect. This variable is, however, not a very relevant control variable. The electoral
support that joint lists receive at the county level is minuscule (see Table 3).
As noted above, pre-reform incumbents may also respond to the electoral reform.
Incumbent politicians may strategically decrease the total number of seats on the local
19council to maintain part of their advantage after the electoral reform.16 Our results
support this conjecture. On average, the size of the local council is reduced by about 2:5
council members, which corresponds to an average decrease of slightly below 10 percent.17
The eect is statistically signicant at the 1 percent level, and does not change if we
control for the council size at the county level.
We next look at the same outcomes for the psychological eects as for the total and
mechanical eects, and do the counterfactual analysis explained in Section 4. The results
from using the actual vote outcome prior to the reform are compared to what the outcome
would have been if the seats were still allocated using DH and the pre-reform council size
are reported in columns 1, 3 and 5 in Table 7 (going from A to C in Figure 3). We also
present the alternative counterfactual, based on MSL, in columns 2, 4, and 6 (from B to
D in Figure 3). These estimates allow us to compare psychological eects to the total
eects of the electoral reform. The dierence between the estimates for the rst and
second counterfactual can be interpreted as how the psychological eects inuence the
size of the mechanical eect.
The results for the number of parties represented on the council illustrate an interest-
ing nding. When we use MSL to allocate the seats the change in the number of parties
represented is statistically signicant at the 1 percent level and is larger than when we
use DH (which is statistically signicant only at the 10 percent level). The reason for this
is that the votes for \new" parties would in some cases not have been enough to surpass
the electoral threshold under DH, while it would for the electoral threshold using MSL.
This nding supports the idea that voters and parties react strategically to changes in
the eective electoral threshold. Under DH there would not have been any reason to vote
for some of these marginal parties, or for these parties to run, since they would have a
low chance of getting seated on the municipal council.
16The number of council members to be allocated in the next election must be chosen within the rst
three years of the election period. Since the white paper that lead to the reform were published January
2001, it implies that incumbent politicians had about a year to change the number of seats available.
17For the average-sized local council of 27 members the pure mechanical eect of changing from DH
to MSL is a reduction in the eective threshold from about 3.57 percent to 2.65 percent. A decrease in
the council size of 2.5 council members would increase the eective threshold from 2.65 to 2.91 percent.
20For the eective number of parties we do not nd that the change in the vote distri-
bution has any eect. This is in line with the results presented in the previous section,
where we found the mechanical eect to be about the same size as the total eect.
Similarly to the eect for the eective number of parties, we only nd a small eect
on the disproportionality index, which is statistically signicant only when we use DH.
In Table 8 we present results when we do not hold the council size constant, but instead
use the actual council size. This table allows us to show the combined eect of strategic
voters, parties, and incumbents. We nd that in comparison to Table 7, which only
included strategic voters and strategic parties, there is no longer any eect on the number
parties represented when using DH. For MSL, the eect is reduced, and statistically
signicant only at the 10 percent level. This shows that the strategic reduction in seats
indeed had the expected eect of counteracting the eect of the electoral reform.
When we allow council size to vary, we also do not nd any change in the eective
number of parties. For the disproportionality index we nd a fairly large eect, in the
opposite direction of the mechanical eect. The combined eect of strategic voters, parties
and incumbents is about half the size of the mechanical eect (in absolute value). Hence
the psychological eects dampens the total eect with about 50 percent. This is mainly
driven by the reduction in council size, which we see by comparing the point estimates
in Table 8 with those in Table 7.
5.4 Time Trends
Our identication strategy is based on the assumption that there are no time trends in
our outcome variables which are specic to the municipal elections. To investigate the
plausibility of this assumption we add information from one election preceding the reform
(1995) and one election following the reform (2007).18
18In our baseline specication, the results are based on vote shares that take preferential voting into
account. We do not have such voting data available for all municipalities for the 1995 election. For this
election, we only have complete voting data for municipalities that had no more than a maximum of
one independent party list, one \other" party list, or one joint list (about 90 percent fulll this criteria).
This incomplete data has two implications. First, the Gallagher index will be based on slightly dierent
21Table 9 presents results based on the full sample, where the reform dummy is (as in
our baseline specications) equal to one for elections based on MSL (2003 and 2007) and
zero otherwise. We nd results very similar to those reported in our baseline specication
(Table 4 and Table 6). This also holds when we add a linear time trend for each of these
specications, reported in Table 10. The exception is the reform's eect on the council
size, which is reduced by about 40 percent when we allow for a linear trend. It is, however,
still statistically signicant at the 1 percent level.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we uncover the causal eects of changing the seat allocation method from
d'Hondt to modied Sainte-Lag ue for Norwegian municipal elections. To separate the
psychological and mechanical eects of electoral reform, we utilize the concept of coun-
terfactual seat allocations. We nd that the electoral reform increased the proportionality
of the seat allocation, the number of parties represented and the eective number of par-
ties. This result was driven by a combination of psychological and mechanical eects.
The psychological eects of the electoral reform served to dampen the mechanical eects
on proportionality.
The psychological eects are partly driven by dynamic adjustment on the political
system's supply side: on average, the number of party lists running in a given district
increases after the reform. We also document that the vote distribution shifts towards
smaller parties. Whether a shift in the vote distribution towards smaller parties would
have occurred in the absence of any strategic entry of party lists, we cannot say. An
important topic for future research is to look more closely at the relative importance of
strategic responses in the mass electorate vis-a-vis strategic responses in the elite strata.
Our analysis demonstrates that to understand the consequences of electoral reform,
data. In practice, this is a minor problem. The two alternative Gallagher Indexes show a raw correlation
of 0.98 for the 2003 election. Second, the analysis of the Gallagher index needs to be limited to those
municipalities that had no more than a maximum of one independent party list, one \other" party list
or one joint list for the 1995 election. To be consistent we also do this for the period 1999-2007 period.
22one needs to take into account not only mechanical eects, but also the strategic responses
from political agents in anticipation of these. Such psychological eects are likely to be
even larger for quantitatively larger electoral reforms, such as a change from majoritarian
to proportional elections systems.
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26Table 1: Summary statistics 1999 and 2003 elections
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
ListsAvailable 6.536 1.966 2 15
ListsCouncil 6.099 1.603 2 11
ENOP 4.242 1.08 1.665 7.367
Index 2.659 1.02 0.254 6.711
JointLists 0.076 0.275 0 2
SizeOfCouncil 26.729 10.59 11 85
N 774
Table 2: Summary statistics
(1) (2)
Pre-reform Post-reform
mean sd mean sd
ListsAvailable 6.35 (1.89) 6.73 (2.02)
ListsCouncil 6 (1.60) 6.20 (1.60)
ENOP 4.11 (1.02) 4.37 (1.13)
Index 2.91 (1.11) 2.41 (0.85)
JointLists 0.085 (0.28) 0.067 (0.27)
SizeOfCouncil 28.0 (11.1) 25.5 (9.93)
N 387 387
Table 3: Descriptive statistics by party list
Party list Fraction Available Fraction Council Voteshare VoteshareC
Red Electoral Alliance (RV) 0.216 0.089 0.006 0.011
Socialist Left Party (SV) 0.683 0.676 0.070 0.086
Labor Party (DNA) 0.995 0.995 0.299 0.290
Liberal Party (V) 0.660 0.572 0.045 0.043
Centre Party (SP) 0.902 0.879 0.167 0.175
Christian Democratic Party (KrF) 0.753 0.733 0.083 0.099
Conservative Party (H) 0.863 0.855 0.141 0.135
Progress Party (FrP) 0.658 0.641 0.087 0.124
Independent Lists 0.370 0.357 0.067 0.000
Other Lists 0.213 0.149 0.016 0.037
Joint Lists Left 0.014 0.013 0.002 0.001
Joint Lists Right 0.061 0.059 0.017 0.000
Note: Descriptives based on data from 1999 and 2003 elections
27Table 4: Total eect of electoral reform on number of party lists represented in council,
eective number of parties, and disproportionality of the electoral system
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ListsCouncil ListsCouncil ENOP ENOP Index Index
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Reform 0.199*** 0.216*** 0.261*** 0.247*** -0.422*** -0.424***







cons 6.000*** 4.797*** 4.112*** 2.299*** 2.831*** 2.694***
(0.02) (0.39) (0.02) (0.25) (0.03) (0.22)
N 774 774 774 774 774 774
R2 0.043 0.069 0.126 0.264 0.111 0.112
Note: Municipality xed eects included in all specications. Standard errors clustered at the
municipality level in parentheses. * p < 0.10,** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table 5: Mechanical eect of electoral reform on number of party lists represented in
council, eective number of parties, and disproportionality of the electoral system
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ListsCouncil ListsCouncil ENOP ENOP Index Index
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
reform 0.121*** 0.209*** 0.251*** 0.290*** -0.751*** -0.938***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.05)
cons 6.003*** 5.990*** 4.112*** 4.082*** 2.913*** 3.344***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03)
N 774 774 774 774 774 774
R2 0.091 0.182 0.540 0.547 0.429 0.465
Voting Data 1999 2003 1999 2003 1999 2003
Note: Municipality xed eects included in all specications. Standard errors clustered at the munici-
pality level in parentheses. * p < 0.10,** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
28Table 6: Total eect of electoral reform on number of party lists running, extent of joint
lists, and the size of the local council
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ListsAvail ListsAvail JointLists JointLists SizeOfCouncil SizeOfCouncil
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Reform 0.380*** 0.298*** -0.018 -0.017 -2.475*** -2.347***







cons 6.346*** 5.570*** 0.085*** 0.089*** 27.966*** 27.221***
(0.03) (0.40) (0.01) (0.01) (0.10) (1.80)
N 774 774 774 774 774 774
R2 0.119 0.127 0.004 0.008 0.280 0.280
Note: Municipality xed eects included in all specications. Standard errors clustered at the
municipality level in parentheses. * p < 0.10,** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table 7: Psychological eect of electoral reform on number of party lists represented in
council, eective number of parties, and disproportionality of the electoral system. Size
of council held constant
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ListsCouncil ListsCouncil ENOP ENOP Index Index
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Reform 0.087* 0.113** -0.013 0.022 0.138* 0.072













cons 4.554*** 5.240*** 2.222*** 2.298*** 2.904*** 2.343***
(0.407) (0.376) (0.243) (0.280) (0.259) (0.196)
N 774 774 774 774 774 774
R2 0.042 0.023 0.174 0.157 0.009 0.007
Formula DH MSL DH MSL DH MSL
Council Size 1999 2003 1999 2003 1999 2003
Note: Municipality xed eects included in all specications. Standard errors clustered at the munici-
pality level in parentheses. * p < 0.10,** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
29Table 8: Psychological eect of electoral reform on number of party lists represented in
council, eective number of parties, and disportionality of the electoral system. Size of
council allowed to vary
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ListsCouncil ListsCouncil ENOP ENOP Index Index
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Reform 0.007 0.089* -0.044 0.005 0.429*** 0.243***













cons 4.573*** 5.141*** 2.205*** 2.247*** 2.736*** 2.137***
(0.427) (0.372) (0.236) (0.287) (0.293) (0.173)
N 774 774 774 774 774 774
R2 0.034 0.022 0.178 0.166 0.072 0.071
Formula DH MSL DH MSL DH MSL
Council Size Vary Vary Vary Vary Vary Vary
Note: Municipality xed eects included in all specications. Standard errors clustered at the munici-
pality level in parentheses. * p < 0.10,** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table 9: Total eects of electoral reform, based on panel data from 1995 to 2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ListsCouncil ENOP Index ListsAvailable SizeOfCouncil
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Reform 0.245*** 0.233*** -0.449*** 0.468*** -2.678***











cons 4.344*** 1.730*** 2.621*** 6.308*** 26.814***
(0.21) (0.16) (0.13) (0.25) (1.27)
N 1483 1483 1408 1483 1483
R2 0.097 0.312 0.091 0.117 0.308
Note: Municipality xed eects included in all specications. Standard errors clustered at the munici-
pality level in parentheses. * p < 0.10,** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
30Table 10: Total eects of electoral reform, based on panel data from 1995 to 2007, allowing
for linear trend
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ListsCouncil ENOP Index ListsAvailable SizeOfCouncil
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Reform 0.224*** 0.258*** -0.409*** 0.324*** -1.744***
(0.07) (0.05) (0.10) (0.08) (0.29)
trend 0.011 -0.013 -0.020 0.075** -0.550***











cons 4.299*** 1.786*** 2.712*** 5.996*** 30.059***
(0.24) (0.19) (0.21) (0.29) (1.53)
N 1483 1483 1408 1483 1483
R2 0.097 0.313 0.091 0.120 0.318
Note: Municipality xed eects included in all specications. Standard errors clustered at the munici-
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To illustrate the dierences between the seat allocation methods we will rst turn to
Figure 4. This simplex illustrates the simplest possible setting of a proportional election
system, which is the allocation of three seats between three parties. Each contiguous
region in the simplex represents a specic seat allocation. This allocation is displayed by
three numbers at the center of each region in the simplex. For example, in the region in
the bottom left corner, Party 3 receives all seats, S=(0,0,3), since the other parties get
too few votes. The seat thresholds are the boundaries between the contiguous regions,
drawn as solid black lines for DH, dotted black for MSL, and dotted gray for SL. Crossing
such a threshold changes the seat allocation. For example, suppose that we start from
the bottom left corner and move right along the \bottom" line of the simplex, along
which Party 2 holds a vote share of zero. Moving along this line, Party 1 will gain its
rst seat when its vote share surpasses 17 percent if we use SL, 22 percent for MSL and
25 percent if we use DH. This seat that Party 1 gains was previously held by Party 3. In
other words, the seat allocation changes from S=(0,0,3) to S=(1,0,2).
The graph illustrate two main points. The rst one is that there is no explicit vote
share threshold for when a party will receive another seat. This is because the seats
a party is awarded depend not only on its vote share, but also on the vote shares for
the other parties. This is true for all seat allocation methods. Also, it is evident that
the variation in the vote share threshold increases with the vote share. The second key
point is that threshold for getting the rst seat is highest using DH, and lowest using SL.
Furthermore the threshold for the second and third seats is lowest for DH, while highest
for SL. This validates the fact that large parties are advantaged when we use DH.
To illustrate how large the advantages and disadvantages can be expected to be in
the real world we turn to a more realistic setting where we simulate probable vote share
distributions. In the simulation we use a party structure similar to that in the Scan-
dinavian countries. The average size relationship between the parties is 6, 4, 3, 2, 1,
340.5, 0.5. In the simulations the size coecient for the party is multiplied by a uniformly
distributed term. The simulated votes are then used to allocate seats in 100,000 councils
that have the same size distribution as Norwegian municipal councils: an average size of
27 members, a minimal size of 11 members, and a maximum size of 85 members.
In Figure 5 we show the average dierence between the seat share and vote share
(seat bias) as function of the vote share for each of the seat allocation methods using
the simulated data. The relationships are shown with the solid circles for DH, with X's
for MSL, and hollow triangles for SL. What stands out in the comparison of the three
methods is the large advantage DH gives to large parties. A party holding a vote share
of 40 percent, will on average receive a \seat share bonus" of 4 percentage points. The
large advantage comes at the expense of all smaller parties, not only those near the
threshold for receiving the rst seat. For SL the \seat share bonus" is virtually zero,
and a little bit less than 1 percentage point for MSL. For MSL the small advantage for
large parties comes from the fact the adjusted series make it harder to get the rst seat.
The disadvantage for small parties does disappear when moving away from the threshold
for the rst seat. That there is a small advantage for large parties under SL is simply
a product of how the votes are simulated. If all parties had the same average size there
would be no advantage for large parties.
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